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Abstract: 
 
Demographic changes have aroused considerable anxiety in transition countries, 
affecting fiscal policy, labor markets, investment and savings behavior. 
Montenegro faces an aging population, falling fertility rates, low income per 
capita, low savings rate and a national budget constrained by fiscal deficits, escalating 
social costs, and foreign debt service problem. Devising a viable solution for the 
economic and social welfare of current and future generations is critical.  
 
Keywords: Aging, Labor market structure, Fiscal policy, Economic Growth 
 
JEL classification : J 11, O 15 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on demographic changes in Montenegro and other transition 
countries, its future trends and impact on economic performance. In the first part, we 
review literature explaining demographic changes and their impact on economic 
performance. This is followed by an analysis of demographic changes in transition 
countries and their special problems. These problems are then placed in the context of 
theoretical and practical ideas and solutions available in the literature.  
Demographic changes occurred in Montenegro will be analyzed in detail.  A 
hundred year projection of demographic structure will show future trends.
In the final part, we show that the demographic structure has a strong impact on 
economic performance in Montenegro. In order to provide sustainable economic growth 
in transition countries, current and future demographic issues have to be seriously 
considered in defining economic strategies for the economic and social welfare of current 
and future generations. 
 
2. The relationship that exist between demographic changes and economic growth – 
literature review 
 
Analysis of the impact of demographic structure on economic growth is not new.   
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“Adam Smith claimed that growth was related to the division of labor, but he did 
not link them in a clear way. Thomas Malthus developed a formal model of a 
dynamic growth process in which each country converged toward a stationary per 
capita income. According to his model, death rates fall and fertility rises when 
income exceeds the equilibrium level, and the opposite occurs when income is 
less than that level. Despite the influence of the Malthusian model on nineteenth-
century economists, fertility fell rather than rose as income grew during the past 
150 years in the West and other parts of the world. The neoclassical model of 
growth responded to the failure of the Malthusian model by essentially ignoring 
any link between population and the economy” (Becker, Murphy, Tamura, 1990).
 
Birsdail (1977) reviews principal analytical approaches to the study of the 
relationship between population growth and economic development over the 50's and 
60's. She argues that the sustained economic growth of Western Europe and North 
America during the eighteen and nineteenth centuries was accompanied by the first 
steady and sustained increase of population the world had ever seen. A growing 
population has been proffered as a net contributor to economic growth because of its 
stimulating effect on demand and its risk-reducing incentive to investment; it provides for 
constant improvement of the labor force with better-trained workers and because 
population pressure may encourage technological innovation, particularly in agriculture. 
Moreover, large population size permits economies of scale in production for larger 
markets. 
After World War II mortality rates declined dramatically and population growth 
accelerated in poor countries. Birsdail argues that: 
 
“If population growth had seemed to be directly related to economic progress in 
Europe and North America, it now seemed inversely related to the economic 
prospects of India, China and Latin America. Population growth is no longer seen 
as an unequivocal benefit. The situation in the post-war developing world was 
different from that in industrializing Europe in a number of significant ways. 
Governments in the post-war epoch must be more responsive to education, health, 
and even income standards for their population.  Today's developing countries 
must achieve growth in the face of the competition from already modernized 
countries. Most important, population in poor countries is growing at least twice 
as fast as it was in Europe in the 18th century, at rates of 2-3% a year, in contrast 
to at most 1%. The result is that the age composition in developing countries, 
where as much as half the population is in the young, non-productive groups, is 
much less favorable to production and proportionally more burdensome with 
respect to consumption and social overhead investment.”
 
These unprecedented rates of population growth, while will cause the population 
to double every 20-30 years, has brought attention from economists. The analytical 
models of Nelson (1956) and Leibenstein (1954) reintroduced population as an 
endogenous variable influenced by income. Their models were Malthusian. 
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A seminal contribution to the analysis of the consequences of population growth 
was the work of Coale and Hoover (1956). Constructing a mathematical model of the 
economy of India, they made projections of per capita income under low, medium and 
high (exogenous) fertility assumptions. Over the years, many of their assumptions and 
results have been challenged, but the importance of their work was that reawakened 
economists and others to the demographic factor as a policy variable, rather than an 
exogenous variable.
Other significant studies projected costs of growing population in specific areas as 
education, health services; to analyze labor market, consequences of rapid population 
growth for the balance of payments, future supply of food, general availability of physical 
resources, etc. (Birsdail, 1977)
By the end of 20th century, most developed countries were faced with aging 
population. This attracted attention of economists again, and new research attempted to 
analyze impact of aging population on economic performance in developed countries. 
(Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, Summers, Akerlof, 1990). These studies argued that aging 
population have a negative impact on: (a) saving (as older persons dissave); (b) ratio 
between productive and unproductive groups, which if not compensated for by increased 
productivity, may influence per capita income, fiscal revenues, etc; (c) fiscal policy, 
through increase in social security spending 
 
3. Demographic Trends in Transition Economies 
 
South-East Europe countries (SEE) and Former Soviet Union States (FSU), 
belong to the group of countries with lower medium income (Albania, Armenia, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Serbia and 
Montenegro), or higher medium income countries (Croatia, Czech republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak republic).2
From demographic perspective (i.e. Theory of Demographic Transition), most of 
these countries have approached the post-transition phase (zero rates of population 
growth) or even the future-declining phase (negative population growth rates). Both 
phases are followed by a period of aging population, where become intense when a 
country approaches the future-declining phase. Of these countries, only Albania has high 
population growth rates (transition stage in the theory of demographic transition). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Basic demographic indicators of transition countries in Europe 
                                                 
2 World bank classification: countries were divided among income groups according to 2002 gross national 
income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, 
$735 or less; lower middle income,$736–2,935; upper middle income, $2,936–9,075; and high income, 
$9,076 or more. 
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Population   
(million) 
Average annual 
population 
growth % 
Crude 
mortalit
y rate 
Crude 
birth 
rate 
Natural 
increase 
(per 1000 
persons) 
 Country 
Income 
group
3 1980 2001 2015 
1980-
2001 
2001-15 2001 2001 2001 
1 Albania LMI 2.7 3.2 3.6 0.8 1.0 6.0 17.0 11.0 
2 Armenia LMI 3.1 3.8 4.0 1.0 0.3 7.0 11.0 4.0 
3 Belarus LMI 9.6 10.0 9.3 0.2 -0.5 14.0 9.0 -5.0 
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina LMI 4.1 4.1 4.4 0.0 0.5 8.0 12.0 4.0 
5 Bulgaria LMI 8.9 8.0 7.3 -0.5 -0.7 14.0 9.0 -5.0 
6 Macedonia LMI 1.9 2.0 2.2 0.4 0.4 8.0 13.0 5.0 
7 Romania LMI 22.4 22.4 21.4 0.0 -0.3 12.0 10.0 -2.0 
8 Russia LMI 139.0 144.8 134.5 0.2 -0.5 16.0 9.0 -7.0 
9 Serbia and Montenegro LMI 9.8 10.7 10.7 0.4 0.1 11.0 12.0 1.0 
10 Croatia HMI 4.6 4.4 4.2 -0.2 -0.3 11.0 9.0 -2.0 
11 Check Republic HMI 10.2 10.2 9.9 0.0 -0.2 11.0 9.0 -2.0 
12 Estonia HMI 1.5 1.4 1.3 -0.4 -0.5 14.0 9.0 -5.0 
13 Hungary HMI 10.7 10.2 9.4 -0.2 -0.6 13.0 10.0 -3.0 
14 Latvia HMI 2.5 2.4 2.1 -0.4 -0.7 14.0 8.0 -6.0 
15 Lithuania HMI 3.4 3.5 3.4 0.1 -0.2 12.0 9.0 -3.0 
16 Poland HMI 35.6 38.6 38.4 0.4 0.0 9.0 10.0 1.0 
17 Slovakia HMI 5.0 5.4 5.4 0.4 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 
                   0.0 
 World   4,429.6 6,130.1 7,093.9 1.5 1.0 9.0 21.0 12.0 
 Low Income   1,613.4 2,505.9 3,090.9 2.1 1.5 11.0 29.0 18.0 
 Lower-Medium Income (LMI)   1,626.4 2,163.5 2,413.0 1.4 0.8 8.0 17.0 9.0 
 Higher-Medium Income (HMI)   362.4 503.6 588.1 1.6 1.1 7.0 20.0 13.0 
 Europe and Central Asia   425.8 474.6 476.6 0.5 0.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 
 High Income   827.4 957.0 1,001.9 0.7 0.3 9.0 12.0 3.0 
 EMU   286.7 306.7 306.0 0.3 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 
                     
Source: World Development Report (2003), World Bank 
 
Empirical evidence shows that countries, which are in the post-transition 
demographic phase, are at the same time at a very high level of economic development 
(high income countries). Developing countries (lower and higher medium income group) 
are normally in the transition demographic phase. Based on such scenarios, models, 
policies and practice concerning economic development, fiscal policy, financial system, 
social security, etc. have been developed. 
The situation in transition countries is quite different. While demographic trends 
in some transition countries would attribute the pattern of high-income country, these 
transition countries are lower medium income countries. Further, average GDP growth 
rates in these countries during the last decade have been negative.  
But which models and policies are most applicable in Montenegro and other 
transition countries? Models that are usually applied to developing countries, with low or 
                                                 
3 World bank classification: countries were divided among income groups according to 2002 gross national 
income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, 
$735 or less; lower middle income, $736–2,935; upper middle income, $2,936–9,075; and high income, 
$9,076 or more. 
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medium level of income, assume high population growth rates, high fertility rates and 
low mortality rates. Models applicable to developed countries assume low population 
growth rates and high income level. Neither model is applicable, as the quantitative 
structure of population has an impact on structure and size of production, consumption, 
savings, investment, government spending and revenues. 
While the moderately growing population will have a positive net impact on 
economic growth, an aging population will have a negative impact on the labor supply, 
saving, fiscal revenues, and a positive impact on social security expenditures.  
The size of the problem is negatively correlated with the level of per capita 
income. Higher income countries have more tools and instruments to cope with these 
problems, while in lower income countries set of available tools and instruments is 
limited.  
Why are transition countries facing this problem? Under centrally planned system 
(socialism) (the first 30 years), economic growth rates were positive and income per 
capita grew. This influenced the demographic structure, moving these countries toward 
low fertility and mortality rates. After the failure of socialism, all these countries faced 
economic brake-down and recession, followed by a decrease in per capita income and 
negative output growth rates. While the economic situation changed significantly, 
moving these countries to lower levels of income, the demographic trends remained the 
same. The outcome is lower income but “high” stage in demographic development; a 
scenario that has not been analyzed in literature. Consequently, transition countries are 
facing huge problems. While this paper focuses on Montenegro, similar problems exist in 
all lower-middle income transition countries that are in the post-transition demographic 
stage. Analysis based on Montenegro's case shows that the current and future 
demographic structure is more an obstacle than a source of economic growth. Indicators 
in other transition countries show that similar conclusions may be implied to them as 
well. 
 
4. Population in Montenegro during the last century 
 
Population in Montenegro doubled, from 311 thousands in 1921 to 658 thousands 
in 2001. Average age increased from 27.3 (1921) to 32.53 (1991) and than to 35 (2001).  
The aging index (ratio of population older than 60 to the population younger than 20) 
more than doubled, from 21.1 (1921) to 56.6 (2001). In 1991, the total dependency ratio, 
representing number of dependants (sum of children and aged people) per hundred 
working age people was 51.24, while the child dependency ratio was 38.85 and aged 
dependency ratio was 12.39. The average annual population growth rate from 1921-1991 
was 0.89%. At the same time, older population groups have grown faster than younger 
population groups. Since the institutional transition started (1989), average annual 
population growth in Montenegro has been 0.67%, while in the world it was 1.63%, in 
developing countries 1.93% and in developed countries 0.54%. Later we will see that the 
population will continue to age and the dependency ratio will increase further. 
The demographic trends in Montenegro are also found in many other countries. 
According to the Rowland, (2003), who cited the World bank, the total dependency ratio 
in the more developed world will increase from 50 in 1990 to 71 in 2050. The aged 
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dependency ratio will increase from 18 to 41, while the child dependency ratio will 
decrease from 32 to 30 as result of the lower fertility rate.  
The fertility rate in Montenegro decreased from 5.1 (1921) to 1.7 in 2001. The 
low fertility rate in 2001 was the result of high economic and political instability, a low 
level of income, high costs of rising children and developed instruments for family 
planning. In our projections, we will use 1991 census data, as those reflect population in 
Montenegro more accurate. 2001 fertility statistics were biased by political and economic 
temporary shocks (Balkan wars and high political instability). Also, if similar shocks 
repeats in the future and fertility rates decline below 1991 level, it will be signal for 
policy makers to introduce adequate population policies, as child-bearing support, which 
will increase fertility. 
 
5. Population in Montenegro (1991-2091) 
 
Based on cohort components method, the population in Montenegro was 
estimated up to 2091. As a base, 1991 census data were used, as those are the latest 
available census data. Some more recent demographic indicators, as fertility and 
mortality rates were available, but in order to avoid data time-inconsistency and biasness 
caused by temporary shocks, we decided to use 1991 census data. 
Basic assumptions for projections: specific age fertility rate and specific age death 
rate were assumed to be constant during next century. Absolute specific age net 
migrations were assumed to be negative and fixed until 2026 (while relative specific age 
net migration (net migration rate) decreased constantly due to increasing specific age 
population), and than are equal to zero. Constant absolute specific age net migration, 
under growing population, provides declining relative specific age net-migration rates4. 
Negative net migration rates were evidenced in Montenegro in periods of economic and 
political instability, particularly at the end on XX century. It is natural to assume that 
such migration trends will continue as long as instability exists, with declining trends 
strongly correlated with increasing stability. Similar experience was evidenced in other 
transition countries. Korcelli’s research had shown that: “Since 1989, as a consequence of 
rapid political and economic change toward democracy and market economy, the level of 
emigration from Poland has decreased”. 
Zero rates of net migration rely on the optimistic scenario of economic and 
institutional development in Montenegro in next two decades, despite the fact that 
demographic components will be more of an obstacle than the source of such trends. If, 
instead of assuming zero a specific net migration rate starting in 2026, we assume 
negative rates to continue, the demographic structure of a population will shift so that 
unproductive groups dominate even more. 
 
Table 2. Population in Montenegro 1991-2091 (cohort model projections) 
                                                 
4 Alternative approach to define assumptions for net-migration is to assume non-fixed absolute specific net-
migration. But, as international migration statistics for the last decade in Montenegro is not completely 
reliable, there is possibility that absolute specific net-migrations are higher than reported. If that is so, than 
assumption that absolute net-migration will change may violate accuracy of projections, as underreported 
present figures will cause underestimated projected figures. As more accurate approach, we decided to use 
fixed absolute specific net-migration rates, which will, under growing population, result in declining 
specific net-migration rates. 
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Montenegro Annual Average Annual Annual  Annual CBR CDR 
    Growth  Annual Births Deaths Natural     
Year Population Rate % Increase     Increase     
1991 609,113  0      
1996 633,945 0.80 4,966 9,627 4,421 5,206 15.2 7.0 
2001 657,227 0.72 4,656 9,882 4,986 4,896 15.0 7.6 
2006 678,277 0.63 4,210 10,096 5,646 4,450 14.9 8.3 
2011 695,781 0.51 3,501 10,102 6,361 3,741 14.5 9.1 
2016 708,612 0.37 2,566 9,859 7,053 2,806 13.9 10.0 
2021 718,257 0.27 1,929 9,596 7,427 2,169 13.4 10.3 
2026 725,267 0.19 1,402 9,503 7,861 1,642 13.1 10.8 
2031 730,965 0.16 1,140 9,528 8,388 1,140 13.0 11.5 
2036 733,803 0.08 568 9,535 8,967 568 13.0 12.2 
2041 733,901 0.00 20 9,446 9,427 20 12.9 12.8 
2046 731,688 -0.06 -443 9,302 9,745 -443 12.7 13.3 
2051 727,901 -0.10 -757 9,183 9,940 -757 12.6 13.7 
2056 723,092 -0.13 -962 9,121 10,082 -962 12.6 13.9 
2061 717,507 -0.15 -1,117 9,082 10,199 -1,117 12.7 14.2 
2066 711,542 -0.17 -1,193 9,023 10,216 -1,193 12.7 14.4 
2071 705,556 -0.17 -1,197 8,934 10,132 -1,197 12.7 14.4 
2076 699,822 -0.16 -1,147 8,838 9,985 -1,147 12.6 14.3 
2081 694,194 -0.16 -1,126 8,758 9,883 -1,126 12.6 14.2 
2086 688,438 -0.17 -1,151 8,694 9,845 -1,151 12.6 14.3 
2091 682,590 -0.17 -1,170 8,632 9,802 -1,170 12.6 14.4 
 
At the beginning of 21st century, Montenegro is approaching a post-transition 
demographic era, characterized by almost an equal crude birth rate and crude death rate, 
and both slightly higher than 10 per thousand people. The post-transition period should 
end in the fifth decade, when the “future declining” period starts with a constant decline 
in population, low fertility rates and aging. 
 
Graph 1: Demographic Transition in Montenegro: 1921-2091 
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5.1. Age structure of population in Montenegro 
While age structure in Montenegro in 1991 (2001) can be described as “mature”, 
the age structure projected for 2051 can be defined as “old”. “Mature” populations are 
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those where the transition from young to old people has started, but still, the percentage 
of children is high. On the other hand, “old” describes a “rectangular age profile with 
similar numbers or percentages in each age group up to those where mortality is high. An 
“old” population is indicative of low birth and death rates.” (D. Rowland, 2003) 
When the population is described as “mature” but going to become the “old”, it 
means that the population is aging. Aging is the result of fertility decline, followed by 
low death rates of the older population.  
 
Graph 2: Age structure in Montenegro: 1991-2091 
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5.2. Dependency ratio 
 
Dependency ratios provide summary measures of age composition, with particular 
reference to relative number of “unproductive-dependants” and “productive-supporters” 
groups. The ratios are based on a division of the age range into three broad groupings: 
children (0-14), working age (15-64) and elderly (65 and over). (D. Rowland, 2003) 
The child dependency ratio represents the number of children per hundred 
working age persons. The aged dependency ratio is the number of elderly people per 
hundred working age people. The total dependency ratio represents number of 
dependants (sum of children and elderly) per hundred working age people. 
The total dependency ratio is expected to grow from 51.24 (1991) to 59.56 (2041) 
and than to 62.07 (2091). Growth in the total dependency ratio is mostly influenced by an 
increase in aged dependency ratio, which is expected to increase from 12.39 (1991) to 
32.08 (2091). The child dependency ratio will probably decrease due to the low fertility 
rate and decrease in births over time. 
 
Graph 3: Dependency ratio in Montenegro: 1991-2091 
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The total dependency ratio in more developed countries in 2050 is projected to be 
71 (in 1990 it was 50), while in less developed countries to 54 (in 1990 – 67). (D. 
Rowland, 2003) Demographic trends in Montenegro have been more comparable to 
developed countries, due to fact that both have been in the same stage of demographic 
transition. 
 
6. Impact of Demographic Changes on Economic growth 
 
Institutional restructuring or the transition from centrally planned to a market 
oriented economy started in Montenegro in 19895. The transition process was interrupted 
in 1991 due to political instability in the region (Balkan wars), which continued trough 
1998.  Institutional and economic reforms have focused on establishing a free-market, 
private-property economy in an effort to create a base for economic recovery and growth. 
After more than a decade, Montenegro is still carrying out reforms. Vukotic and 
Bacovic, (2003) argue that: “At the same time, the economic situation continues to be 
unstable, with external, fiscal and internal macroeconomic disequilibria, and modest GDP 
growth rates. Large state-owned companies (electricity, telecommunication, non-metal 
processing industry, transportation, public services as education, health and 
administration, etc) are still significant source of domestic income (more than 60%). 
Private companies are mostly engaged in trade, tourism and agriculture and are the main 
source of economic growth.  Productivity and economic efficiency of most non-privately 
owned companies continued to decline.”  
According to the Business Environment Survey (2003)6, the basic determinants of 
business conditions in most companies are: the large debts for large companies and lack 
of financial sources for small companies (this is followed with high interest rates); Over-
employment, particularly in large, privatized and state owned companies; Lack of quality 
workers, especially evidenced in privatized and mixed-ownership companies; Lack of 
managerial skills; Cost of doing business (taxes and contributions); Legislation (frequent 
                                                 
5 Montenegro is small economy, with population of 660 thousands in 2001. It is one of six Former 
Yugoslavia Republics. Today it is part of the Union of States of Serbia and Montenegro.  
6 For detailed report, visit www.visit-ceed.org  
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changes in the legal and regulatory environment and inefficiency of commercial courts); 
Political situation; Administrative barriers; Unfair competition and existing monopolies. 
Other than these factors, important social and demographic determinants that 
impact institutional reforms and economic performance: 
 
  Prevailing culture (informal rules)7. S.Pejovich (2003) defines culture  “as a 
synthesis of the community’s traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs, 
and all other informal norms of behavior that have passed the test of time and bind 
the generations”. Conflict between the prevailing culture in a country and the 
behavioral incentives of the formal institutions of capitalism, increases the 
transaction costs of enforcing and maintaining those institutions. The rising 
strength of anti-free-market political parties and groups in many C&EE countries 
provides evidence that the prevailing culture in the region is not in harmony with 
the basic institutions of capitalism. Of course, the higher the cost of enforcing new 
rules, the weaker the enforcement. Indeed, anti free-market political parties and 
groups have succeeded in weakening the enforcement of new rules in many 
C&EE countries. (S.Pejovich, 2003) 
 
  Demographic structure. In this paper we will assume that productive groups are 
those aged from 15-64 (potential labor force) while unproductive are those aged 
from 0-14 and 65+. This is not quite precise definition of productive/unproductive 
people, as significant percentage of people aged from 15-64 may be unproductive-
dependants. But in order to simplify the analysis in this paper, the assumption will 
be accepted, also as it is not going to change direction of demographic trends and 
its impact on economic efficiency.  
 
Demographic structure and changes influence economic performance, but the 
causality can also take the opposite direction. Low income per capita has a strong impact 
on the fertility rate, due to the inability of parents to cover expenditures related to 
children. Female participation in the labor force is high which is an additional constraint 
on the fertility rate. High unemployment and low wages influence emigration to more 
developed countries, especially of educated and young persons. This has negative impact 
on labor market structure, human capital and overall economic performance. Less 
significant is the impact on mortality rates, which have not changed significantly due to 
public health services provided by the state. 
To illustrate the impact of demographic structure on economics and institutional 
restructuring, we take the pension and tax system in Montenegro as an example.  Similar 
model could be used to illustrate the impact on GDP per capita, savings and many other 
components. 
The pension system in Montenegro is still based on “generation solidarity (pay as 
you go)” which means that current pensions are financed from contributions of currently 
employed workers. Pensions are a legal obligation of the state and pensioners are legally 
entitled to receive a monthly payment. This payment is not determined by current pension 
contributions, but rather the contributions made by pensioners during his (her) working 
life adjusted by the real growth rate of net wages. 
                                                 
7 For more, see: Pejovich Svetozar:”Why is culture important”, Preduzetnicka ekonomija, Vol II (2003) 
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No matter what current revenues the pension fund receives, the state pension fund 
is obliged to pay pension to all pensioners. In Montenegro, revenues from pension 
contributions finance at most 60% of benefits, while the other 40% is provided through 
other tax revenues and transfers to the government from abroad. Since the growth in 
average wage per worker automatically causes an adjustment in the benefits, the ratio of 
workers to pensioners is a key determinant of the relationship between revenues and 
obligations for benefits. 
 
tavgtttavgttt WpLWpLfPR ,, ),,( !!""  
 
where tPR  is the revenue of the pension fund in period t, tL -number of employees 
paying pension contribution in period t, tp -pension contribution rate and tavgW ,  be the 
average gross wage in period t, which is also the basis for calculate future pension 
contributions. 
On the other side, expenditures of the pension fund can be expressed as: 
 
tavgttavgtt PRPRfPE ,, ),( !""  
where tPE  is the expenditures of pension fund in period t, tR -number of pensioners 
entitled to receive regular monthly pension and tavgP , -average pension in period t. 
If we assume that in the future pension fund revenues and expenditures have to be 
balanced: 
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If we know that tavgW ,  and tavgP ,  are strongly positively correlated, than we may 
conclude that any change in tp  will be determined by change in the ratio of tR  and tL . 
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An increase in the number of pensioners, while tL  is constant, will force tp  to 
increase, while an increase in tL  if tR  is constant, will make it possible to decrease. 
What determines number of employees? While the number of employees in an 
economy cannot theoretically exceed the number of 15-64 population, there are other 
factors as well. A significant percentage of the 15-24 age group do not actively 
participate in the labor force due to education. Other demographic characteristics of 15-
64 population are significant as well, as gender and education structure.  
The stock of human capital of those aged from 15-64 will determine also their 
productivity, reflected through wages. 
Present taxes and contributions are high in Montenegro and should be reduced. 
Current overall taxes and contributions for labor (paid by employees and employer) are 
approximately 100% of net wage. According to a survey of managers, taxes and 
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contributions should not exceed 50.8% of net wage, and this is the level that will provide 
necessary conditions to increase economic efficiency and force development of the 
company8.  
The current pension contribution rate in Montenegro is 39.12% of the net wage 
(24% of the gross wage). It is the key component of the taxes and contributions for labor, 
so we analyze possibility to decrease it by 50%, as managers believe would be 
economically reasonable. 
We did a simple estimation, based on empirical data from Montenegro. Instead of 
use the average net wage, we used the average gross wage and appropriate pension 
contribution rate (24%) in order to comply with accounting standards in Montenegro. 
Also, we assumed a constant average gross wage and constant expenditures from the 
pension fund (constant number of pensioners)9. Based on combination of different 
pension contribution rates and number of employees, we constructed a pension “budget” 
line, representing possible combinations of pension contribution rates and number of 
employees, which will result in constant pension fund revenues under constant wages. 
As expected, the pension budget line is a downward sloping curve. In order to 
reduce pension contribution rate by 50%, the number of employees must increase by 
100%. The average exponential growth (
n
P
P
r
n )ln(
0
" ) of the number of employees 
necessary to substitute decrease in pension contribution rate by 1% is 5%. 
Does Montenegro have demographic potential to increase the number of 
employees by 100%? Yes, but have to use full demographic capacities in productive 
purposes in order to provide resources and conditions for economic recovery. 
Even if Montenegro finds a way to have fully employed its potentially active 
labor force, there is still a problem. Projections show that the number of people in 
productive groups will decline, while the number of people over 65 will increase. This 
means that potential number of tax payers (or pension contribution payers) will decrease 
further while the number of pensioners will increase. It will make the pension budget 
more unbalanced and put more fiscal pressures on productive groups.  
Policy makers need to find a solution to avoid these obstacles coming from 
demographic structure and changes. The most often heard recommendation is to modify 
the pay-as-you-go system, to change the formula for average nominal growth of the 
pensions, breaking the starting relationship between wages and pension benefits. 
Montenegro has decided to adopt the so-called “Switzerland adjustments system under 
pay-as-you-go pension scheme”. Under this system average pensions will increase more 
slowly than wages, by introducing a new method to calculate average pension growth 
rate. Pensions would than grow by a factor which is influenced 50% by real wage growth 
rate and 50% by inflation rate. This creates the possibility to provide faster growth in 
pension revenues than expenditures whenever the nominal growth rate of wages is higher 
                                                 
8 Center for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: Business Environment Survey (2003), 
Podgorica, Montenegro (www.visit-ceed.org)  
9 As projection shows, number of pensioners will increase, but also average gross wage may increase. In 
order to simplify analysis, constant wages and number of pensioners are appropriate assumption, as it wont 
change answer on primary question asked – By which rate employment should increase in order to provide 
basis to decrease pension contribution rate so revenues will remain the same. 
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than inflation. Faster growing revenues will make it possible to reduce the pension 
contribution rate, even if the number of employees remains the same. But, a precondition 
for real wage growth is increase of productivity, which is determined by the level of 
technology and the stock of human capital. Both are at very low levels in Montenegro. 
But, if taxes are high, there are no incentives to invest. Here we have determinately a sort 
of circle. A possible way is to create privately funded pension system, where the 
Government won’t have any obligations to finance pensions. Individuals will make than 
their own savings decisions. But still, we cannot simply jump from one institutional 
solution to the other, nor can we forget about all pensioners from current pension system. 
Who will finance this? Pensioners themselves? Tax payers? Current workers? Donors?   
Answer to this question should be objective of another research paper. In this paper we 
only use this as an example of factors affect economic development. 
  
Conclusion 
 
An aging population, low fertility rates and negative net migration are factors in 
Montenegro and other transition countries. Population projections show that in the future, 
population growth rates will be even lower and possibly even negative, while population 
will continue to age and the dependency ratio will increase.  
An aging population has a negative impact of the labor market structure, saving 
rate and fiscal system. The negative impact on GDP growth may be moderated through 
increased productivity.  
The demographic structure in Montenegro is very similar to the structure of 
higher income countries. While more developed countries have more resources to cope 
with problems coming from demographic changes, low per capita income, high 
unemployment, fiscal deficit constraints and high social costs in transition countries do 
not provide an environment in which economic and social well-being of the aging 
population may be easily achieved.  As Montenegro is lower-medium income country, 
the same economic policies that have been introduced in higher income countries are not 
appropriate. Also, resources available for investment in new technologies are limited, 
which makes increased productivity more difficult.  
Devising a viable solution for the economic and social welfare of current and 
future generations is critical and demographic problems make implementation more 
difficult. 
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